Human capital and payment systems in Britain, 1833-1914 by Baines, Dudley et al.
rIa1 London School of Economics & Political Science Lmll WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 
HUMAN CAPITAL AND PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
IN BRITAIN, 1833-1914 
Dudley Baines, Peter Howlett, Paul Johnson 
Number: 9/92 
August 1992 

Working Paper No. 9/92 
Human Capital and Payment Systems 
in Britain, 1833-1914 
Dudley Baines 
Peter Howlett 
Paul Johnson 
©Dudley Baines, Peter Howlett, Paul Johnson, 
Economic History Department, 
London School of Economics. 
August 1992 
Dudley Baines, Peter Howlett, Paul 10hnson 
Department of Economic History 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
United Kingdom 
Phone: 
Fax: 
+44 (0)71 955 7059 
+44 (0)71 955 7730 
Additional copies of this working paper are available at a cost of £2.50. Cheques 
should be made payable to 'Department of Economic History, LSE' and sent to 
the Departmental Secretary at the address above. 
Human capital and payments systems in Britain, 1833-1914. 1 
Dudley Baines, Peter Howlett, Paullohnson 
Department of Economic History, LSE 
This paper shows how the concept of human capital and human capital theory may be 
used to help investigate some important issues in the history of the British economy 
and labour market in the nineteenth century ? The first part of the paper establishes 
the importance of human capital to the long-run performance of the British economy, 
and the next two sections discuss some of the theoretical and practical problems 
involved in the analysis of human capital , particularly the role of and returns to 
education, and the relationship between earnings and productivity. This is followed 
by two illustrative case studies in which we show how the application of human capital 
theory to historical data can enhance our understanding of the working of the 
nineteenth century labour market and the contribution of human capital to British 
economic growth . 
Human capital and British economic performance 
Economic historians have frequently been concerned with identifying and explaining 
the components of economic growth . They have emphasised the diversity within the 
economists' formulation of the components of growth - 'land', 'labour', 'capital' and 
'enterprise'. 'Capital', for example, could include machinery, animals, stocks of raw 
materials or buildings. It would also include slaves . Slaves were more of a capital than 
a labour input because a large part of their lifetime labour services - and even the 
labour of their unborn children - was purchased for a single payment. 
I We are indebted to the Staff Research Fund of the LSE and to Roy Edwards for 
research assistance. 
2 Modem human capital theory is associated with the work of Gary Becker who 
was the first to analyze the acquisition of transferrable and non-transferrable skills. 
Becker, Human capital, Mincer, Schooling, Hutchens, 'Seniority wages' and Blaug 
'Empirical status ' are important surveys . 
It is easy to visualise the different forms of physical capital . The idea that capital 
could be intangible is much more difficult. The simplest way to think about human 
capital as a component of economic growth is that it is the quality of the labour that 
a worker brings to his or her employment. The quality of labour can be seen as the 
skills that a worker possesses (although, as we will see, human capital usually means 
more than skills) . The ability to work to a higher standard has been acquired by 
investment; in other words, some sacrifice has been made in the past which increases 
the quality of the worker at the moment. Hence, it is appropriate to view the quality 
of work as capital rather than labour which relates to the quantity of work. To an 
individual, investment in human capital and labour would normally be alternatives; for 
example, staying on at school forgoes the income from employment. 
The stock of human capital in the economy is, therefore, the sum of the investment 
that individuals have made, or have had made on their behalf, up to that point. The 
human capital endowment of a worker is not fixed . What is called 'disembodied' 
human capital may be thought of as that possessed by the worker when he or she 
begins employment for the first time. 'Embodied' human capital is that which is 
acquired from work experience. Embodied human capital can include formal training, 
as in an apprenticeship, but also may be ' learnt by doing' - picked up informally at 
the place of work.3 The ability to learn new skills is, of course, itself a skill . We 
would expect human capital to increase with age up to some point. It is likely to be 
acquired rather quickly at the young ages and then at a slower rate. But as the worker 
ages he or she is unable, or occasionally unwilling, to acquire new skills and so their 
human capital endowment remains static or falls . All these qualities which are 
acquired by the worker have a cost and it is important to consider who has paid for 
the worker to acquire them . For example, the cost of creating a prime age industrial 
worker is first paid by his or her parents . There is an implication here: that women 
made a disproportionate contribution to the human capital embodied in a prime age 
3 See, More, Skill, pp. 107-30. 
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industrial worker since the upbringing of children was predominantly entrusted to 
women. 
The important role played by human capital in economic development can be seen in 
the history of international migration. For example, by the late nineteenth century 
emigrants from Europe to the United States, Canada, Argentina and other countries 
were predominantly young adults who were at the peak of their producing and 
consuming power. 4 Because the cost of their upbringing had been met in Europe they 
were a free gift of capital to the countries that they entered. This meant that ceteris 
paribus the human capital stock of those countries was higher than it would have been 
if their labour forces had grown entirely by natural increase. In turn, this meant that 
their economic growth was faster. 5 Migration was also important in the transfer of 
technology which in the earlier nineteenth century was accomplished through the 
migration of workers with specific skills. Examples where individual migration was 
important include the transfer of textile technology from Britain to the United States6 
and to Norway.7 
4 See, Baines, Emigration, pp. 58-65 . 
5 One estimate is that the benefit of immigration to the American economy in the 
early twentieth century was the equivalent of five years' investment. In other words, 
if all the growth in the American labour force had come from natural increase and the 
cost of rearing the immigrants had been borne by the American economy, the capital 
stock in, say, 1910 would have only been at the level it was in 1905. This calculation 
is fraught with difficulties but is likely to be of the right order. Neal & Uselding, 
' Immigration' , pp.84-8. 
6 It did not follow that British technology would be copied exactly. Labour was 
relatively more expensive in the United States than in Britain. Hence, the American 
cotton masters were forced to adapt the British technology. See, Jeremy, Transatlantic 
industrial revolution, pp.76, 148-9, 256. 
7 Bruland, British technology , pp. 126-36. 
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Although it is a priori probable that human capital has played a significant role in 
British economic growth in the past, this is extremely difficult to measure . The most 
careful attempt has been by Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee (hereafter MFOS);8 
they calculated the contribution of changes in the input of human capital to the growth 
of the UK economy between 1856 and 1973. In the absence of more direct measures 
of the human capital stock they used three 'proxy' variables . These were the age 
distribution of the labour force; the intensity of work and the amount of formal 
education the workers had been given. The age distribution of the labour force was 
chosen because we would expect a fall in the proportion of children in the labour force 
to increase its average quality . 9 The effect of age distribution on the human capital 
stock could then be calculated by assuming that the wage paid at each age was equal 
to the marginal product of each age group. In other words, it was assumed -
reasonably - that the labour market was competitive. 
The intensity of work was calculated from an estimate of the number of hours worked 
in different periods. In more recent periods shorter hours of work have not led to 
lower output. Hence, the hours of work estimate was subject to an 'efficiency offset' 
which was designed to take account of this change. 10 The number of years of formal 
education that had been taken by each cohort was not too difficult to estimate. The 
problem was to estimate the increase in output attributable to each additional year of 
schooling - i.e. , how to weight it. There are few data sets that address this question 
and none for the UK for any long run of years . Recourse had to be made to a study 
8 Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee, British economic growth, pp.96-117. 
9 The effect of gender and nationality distribution on the human capital stock was 
also estimated but was not significant. Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee, British 
economic growth, pp. 100-102. 
10 The 'efficiency offset' was assumed to be 100% in 1856-73 falling to zero in 
1951-73. Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee, British economic growth, pp. 102-4. 
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based on the impact of formal education in the French economy covering the years 
after the Second World War. 11 
The MFOS estimates led to some important results . Taking the period 1856-1973 as 
a whole, total factor productivity (the measure of the relation between the increase of 
inputs and outputs in the economy) increased by some 1.1 % p.a. The growth in 
labour quality accounted for 0.6 % - i.e more than half of the growth in the output of 
the economy. 12 We can see, however, that this important result depends on a rather 
rough and ready set of estimates of the human capital input, of which the authors are 
only too aware. They suggest that a margin of error of plus or minus 50% is 
possible. 13 There are two crucial assumptions underpinning the MFOS estimates -
that education makes a positive contribution to worker performance, and that the wage 
paid relates to the productivity of the worker. Neither of these assumptions are self-
evidently true, and in the next two sections we discuss the ways in which economists 
and historians have attempted to evaluate these assumptions. 
Education and economic performance 
There is a clear, positive relationship across countries today between the share of 
national income devoted to education and the level of national income per capita, yet 
economists are divided about the relationship at the individual level between education 
and future income. The main problems concern the precise factors that are measured 
by years of schooling, which even in contemporary studies is usually all the data that 
are available. It is possible, for example that the more able people can assess the 
future value of education better than the less able. If this is the case, what is called an 
'ability bias' would be created . This is because of the way that individual returns to 
education are normally calculated. They are usually taken as the difference between 
11 Denison, Why growth rates differ, pp. 85-7. 
12 Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee, British economic growth, p. 211. 
13 Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee, British economic growth, p. 105. 
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the future earnings of those who choose to have no more education and the future 
earnings of those who do. If there is an ability bias the more able will invest in more 
education and the future income due to education will be overstated. Conversely, the 
effect of education on the future income of the less educated group will be 
understated. The effect is to overstate returns to education as a whole.14 A more 
complicated problem is what is called ' credentialism' . Employers may not be 
concerned with the knowledge and skills obtained from formal education per se but, 
instead, may view education as a filtering process which distinguishes those workers 
who are most easy to train. IS Another argument is that years of schooling do not 
measure the way that children acquire human capital. Children may acquire more 
human capital before they go to school than later. And when they are at school they 
may still be gaining more human capital informally than directly through their 
schooling. Years of schooling would then merely be a proxy for something else . This, 
in fact, has been the assumption of many contemporary studies. 16 
This debate is echoed in some historical writing, where the relative importance of 
disembodied human capital has been disputed. Some historians deny that variables 
such as literacy or schooling are proxies for human capital. These historians consider 
that specific skills learnt at the workplace are more important for economic growth. 
Mitch took this extreme reductionist position in a recent survey. 17 He considered only 
those educational attainments which were directly relevant to specific industrial 
processes. A recent paper by Boot estimated that the amount invested by male cotton 
workers in on the job training in the 1830s was at least as much as the amount 
14 See, Becker, Human capital, pp. 157-66. 
IS Blaug, 'Empirical status', pp. 840, 846-7. 
16 Blaug, 'Empirical status', pp.831 -3. 
17 Mitch, ' Education' . 
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invested in their education,18 though as we will show below, this calculation appears 
to be seriously flawed . 
We believe that the extreme view taken by Mitch is unhelpful; there are likely to be 
both public and private returns to general education - for instance a literate society can 
be more easily governed and taxed than an illiterate one. Some positive economic 
returns from some 'non-relevant' education can be expected, but measurement is 
difficult. Literacy has often been taken as both an output measure of the educational 
system and as a proxy for the measurement of human capital, but its use is often seen 
as problematic. 19 Literacy rates in the past have often been measured from the ability 
of an individual to sign his or her name, but this measure is a very imperfect 
indicator.20 For Britain there is the particular historical problem of literacy rates 
having reached a high level by the early part of the nineteenth century, particularly 
for males . That is, literacy was already high when it became possible systematically 
to measure it. We cannot therefore use changes in the degree of literacy or its spatial 
distribution as evidence of changes in the human capital stock in the later nineteenth 
century. This is not true of, say , Spain or Italy where literacy only began to rise fast 
in the later nineteenth century. There remain, therefore, considerable uncertainties 
about the extent to which formal education enhances human capital, and about how 
best to measure the relationship between educational outputs and economic 
performance. 
18 This conclusion is based on a calculation of the amount invested by each worker 
in on the job training compared with West' s calculation of average annual expenditure 
per child in education. Boot, 'How skilled was the British factory workforce?' , p.13 ; 
West, 'Resource allocation and growth', pp. 82-8. 
19 This was the conclusion of a session at the International Economic History 
Conference at Leuven in 1990. The papers presented were collected in Tortella, 
Education; see the contributions by Mitch , Nicholas and the summary paper by 
Tortella and Sandberg. 
20 Schofield, 'Dimensions of illiteracy' . 
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Remuneration and productivity 
Human capital theory extends beyond the question of what contribution education 
makes to individual performance. It also allows an assessment of the costs and benefits 
of acquiring disembodied and embodied skills once the individual enters the labour 
market, not only from the perspective of the individual but also from the perspective 
of the firm and the economy. The main theoretical advance in this respect in recent 
years has been to acknowledge the existence of an internal market for labour (internal 
to the firm itself) . This internal labour market may operate on different principles to 
those of the external labour market (that is, the labour market described in standard 
economic textbooks) and its operation may have important implications for the 
economy and long term economic growth.21 The basis of the internal labour market 
is the fact that there may be long term benefits to the relationship between employer 
and employee that exceed possible short term economic factors at play in the external 
labour market. 
For the internal labour market to simply reflect the external labour market (in effect, 
for there to be no internal labour market) firms would have to pay workers according 
to their marginal product (which in turn would reflect their training, abilities and 
experience) . This is known as a spot wage payments system. The MFOS assumption 
that workers are paid at each age a wage that reflects the marginal productivity of 
their particular age cohort therefore also implicitly assumes a spot wage payments 
system.22 If the payments system operated by firms , or at least by a significant 
number of firms , in the British economy in the period 1856-1973 deviated from a spot 
wage system it could have serious implications for the MFOS estimates. 
21 A useful , non-technical, introduction to internal labour markets is provided by 
Siebert and Addison, 'Internal labour markets' and by Strober, 'Human capital 
theory'. For a more technical approach see Weiss, Efficiency wages, and Cooper, 
Wage and employment patterns. 
22 Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee, British economic growth . 
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How do we determine whether or not a particular firm operated a payments system 
based on spot wages? The answer is that we need to examine individual wage history 
profiles . Ideally, the wage profiles should be compared to the productivity of the 
worker at each age to assess if indeed spot wages were being paid. Unfortunately, data 
on individual productivity is virtually non-existent and therefore the second best 
solution is to make an assumption about the expected shape of the productivity profile 
(and hence expected spot wage profile) . In most economic and historical models, 
including that of MFOS, age is used as a proxy for training, ability and experience: 
thus, the older a worker is (at least up to a certain point) the greater is their 
productivity and hence they should receive a higher wage. Indeed, one existing 
estimate of individual wage profiles for the nineteenth century shows that wages rose 
fast at young ages but then continued to increase well into adult life, at least for 
males.23 
One of the most obvious alternatives to a spot wages payments system is one based 
on seniority wages. Seniority wages are usually related to length of service but 
sometimes to age, as they were in teaching in Britain between the wars . A payments 
system based on seniority wages is an example of an implicit contract: in such a 
system the worker and employer agree, in effect, to abide by an implicit contract in 
which the wage at any point in time will not be related to current productivity but 
distributed over the period of the contract. There are several reasons for the 
introduction of payments systems based on implicit contracts: the difficulty some 
employers face in trying to distinguish between the output of individual workers; the 
cost to an employer of supervising and monitoring the work of employees; the 
23 Boot, for example, states that most industries in the 1830s had similar profiles 
for male workers . Wages rose rapidly to the early adult years, continued to rise but 
at a slower rate, peaked in ' middle age' (which was about 35 in cotton spinning) then 
declined slowly. Boot, 'How skilled' , pp. 4-5. 
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intangible nature of much white colJar work;24 the desire of the firm to reward 
employee honesty (or loyalty) by paying workers less than their output warranted in 
the early years of employment and more than it warranted in the later years of 
employmenf5; the risk averse nature of workers who may accept (at least initially) 
a wage lower than their marginal productivity in return for implicit job security or for 
training from the firm . 
In trying to assess whether a firm paid spot wages or seniority wages a problem 
arises : the average wage profile under a seniority wage payments system will be 
something akin to a straight line or a series of upward steps but this is very similar 
to the wage profile we would expect under a spot wage system if it is assumed that 
productivity rises with age . Thus, the shape of any iruiividual wage profile will not tell 
us if we are observing spot wages . However, if the wage profiles of large numbers 
of workers were similar we can be sure that they were not being paid spot wages since 
there should be some variation in their productivity (unless one makes the unrealistic 
assumption that all workers were homogenous in terms of both their disembodied 
human capital and their rate of acquiring disembodied human capital) . In a spot wage 
payments system one would expect to see some variation in individual wages relative 
to the mean wage for their age group (this can be assessed by examining the 
coefficient of variation of age related wages for each age group) . If the individual 
24 Thus , the Bank of Scotland introduced an age related salary structure in the 
early nineteenth century (Boot, 'Salaries', pp. 645-6) and the remuneration of 
Victorian clerks tended to be based on annual increments (see Anderson, Victorian 
Clerks , p.25, for a table of salaries in a Liverpool insurance company, 1890-1914). 
25 There are contemporary cases where seniority wages continue to increase even 
when productivity is falling . The explanation is that these wage profiles embody 
implicit contracts where workers are paid more than their marginal productivity in the 
later stages of employment to encourage honesty. The implication is that the seniority 
wage profile is relatively steep. These workers are paid relatively less while 
undergoing training than those workers who eventually earn their marginal product or 
less . 
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wage profiles were similar, and if they rose through the adult years26 , some sort of 
seniority wage was being paid:27 in such a situation the relevant coefficient of 
variation should be close to zero. 
An alternative explanation as to why spot wages might not be paid is that a delayed 
payment schemes may be used to compensate workers for the costs and benefits of 
acquiring skills. We know that in the skilled trades apprenticeship remained important 
into the early twentieth century as More and others have shown. An apprenticeship 
offered a valuable general training. The skills were readily transferrable and there was 
no obligation to stay with the firm where the worker had trained. In this case the cost 
of acquiring an apprenticeship was paid almost entirely by the worker. The apprentice 
was willing to accept low wages which were below his marginal product while he was 
training because he was investing in skills that increased his productivity and, hence, 
his income in the future . It was rational for firms to offer training to people who 
might take their skills elsewhere since the worker had borne the full cost of the 
training. 
By the late nineteenth century Britain had developed an additional method of training 
which combined specific and general training. Apprenticeship taught general and 
specific skills at the workplace . Technical schools, where the workers usually attended 
part-time, taught general skills .28 In other countries the training mix was different. 
26 If we accept a human capital explanation, then the age at which wages peaked 
would have been partly dependent on life expectancy. Life expectancy would affect 
the period in which investment in human capital could be realised . Hence, other things 
remaining equal , we would expect the age at which wages peaked to rise in the 
ni neteenth century. 
27 In a set of seniority wage profiles we would expect any variation in income 
between individuals to decline with age. This would reflect different rates of acquiring 
skills at the younger ages . 
28 More, Skill, pp. 64-93. For the development of technical education in Britain, 
see Cotgrove, Technical education. 
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For example, there was far less part time instruction in the United States and in 
Germany. The dominant form of training in the United States took place at the 
workplace . Hence, it was job specific. The dominant form of training in Germany 
took place in technical schools and was general. The distinction has been analyzed by 
Floud using the insights of human capital theory. He argued that there was little 
demand for the German pattern of formal instruction in the United States because 
workers thought that the short run costs outweighed the benefits . The demand for 
formal training was high in Germany because it was a way that workers who were 
entering industrial occupations for the first time could be ' screened' - i.e. , they could 
demonstrate their ability to benefit from further training . On the other hand , there was 
a demand for part-time technical training in Britain.29 
The development of, so called, process industries , for example, boots and shoes, 
meant that the distinction between skilled and unskilled workers was further eroded. 
The skills that were needed related to a particular production process (a production 
line would be an example) . This meant that many workers in the nineteenth century 
acquired skills that were only useful in the firm in which they were working at the 
time. The skills were not transferrable. Many of these workers were willing to accept 
a delayed payments system rather as the apprentices did . But, for these workers, the 
terms of the implicit contract had to be different. It was not in the workers' interests 
to bear the full cost of training. The skills that they acquired were less valuable in 
another firm . If they could not transfer their skills their bargaining position was weak 
and they could not expect their employer to pay them the full benefits of their training. 
In which case, why did they sacrifice current income to invest in training? 
This problem was first addressed in terms of human capital theory by Becker.30 
Applying Becker' s argument to the nineteenth century: the wage that the workers were 
29 Fioud, 'Technical education', pp. 8-9. 
30 Becker, Human capital, pp. 16-26. 
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paid after they had been trained must have been higher than it would have been if they 
had not undertaken the training. If they had not expected to increase their income they 
would not have trained in the first place. But they would not have been paid a wage 
consonant with their new skills. This made them more valuable to the employer than 
the unskilled workers , which , in turn meant that they were less likely to be laid off. 
Hence, where the skills were not transferrable wages also grew with seniority, but 
employees and employers shared the cost of training. The employee was paid more 
than his marginal product while training and less afterwards . 
Case studies 
Few attempts have been made by historians explicitly to address the questions raised 
by human capital theory: how much does education enhance productivity? were wages 
paid in the past spot wages, i.e., directly related to productivity? for how long, and 
in what sectors, have seniority wage systems and internal labour markets existed? 
Although much time and effort has been spent processing nineteenth century wage 
data, the overriding objective of this research has been the construction of real wage 
series which can be used to address questions about changes in living standards since 
the industrial revolution. Below we give two illustrative examples of the way in 
which human capital theory can be applied to historical wage data in order to draw 
inferences about the economic role of education and internal labour market structures. 
i) The returns to education in the early nineteenth century 
There has been a long and inconclusive debate about the role of and return to formal 
education in the rapidly industrialising economy of early nineteenth century Britain.31 
Descriptive statistics about the costs and benefits of education have been exchanged, 
but few attempts have been made to assess quantitatively the relative returns to formal 
31 West, 'Resource allocation'; West, Education; Hurt, 'Professor West' ; Kiesling, 
' Nineteenth-century education'. 
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education and learning-by-doing. Human capital theory, however, points to a well-
tried method of conducting such tests through the estimation of earnings functions . 
A standard Mincer-Becker earnings function for a homogeneous workforce is of the 
sort: 
InWAGE = a l + aiAGE) + a 3(AGE2) + aiEOUC) + as (EOUC2) + 
a 6(WORK) + a1(WORK2) 
where InWAGE is the natural log of (weekly/monthly/annual) earnings, AGE is age 
in years, EOUC is years of full -time-equivalent education, and WORK is years of 
work experience (with a distinction sometimes drawn between total labour market 
experience and work experience with the current employer). Second order terms for 
AGE, EOUC and WORK are included because it is believed that there is a 
diminishing marginal return to each of these factors; the assumption, therefore, is that 
the coefficients will be positive on AGE, EOUC and WORK, but negative on all the 
squared terms. 
Even with modern data sets it is often difficult to find adequate measures of or proxies 
for education or work experience, and few attempts appear to have been made to 
locate usable historical data. Some data does, however, exist. Below we present an 
estimated earnings function for child workers employed in British factories in the early 
1 84Os. The data is drawn from the interviews conducted in 1843 with child workers 
aged 7 to 14 years by assistants to the Royal Commission on the Employment of 
Children.32 The interviews were not conducted on a systematic basis, and only 261 
cases contained the necessary information about earnings, age and work experience. 
32 Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Trades and Manufactures , 
Supplementary Reports. pp 1843 XIV and XV. 
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Direct information about education was impossible to gather from these interviews, 
and so literacy (ability to write) was taken as a proxy for previous formal education. 
Results of an ordinary least squares estimate of a Mincer-Becker earnings function for 
this group of child workers are presented in equation I of Table I . Only the dummy 
variable for literacy is statistically significant in this equation, but the main reason for 
this poor result appears to be multicollinearity between AGE and AGE2 and WORK 
and WORK\ the correlation coefficients between these pairs of variables are .996 
and .943 respectively . Inspection of the data shows why this is so. Over the age range 
7 to 14 there is no obvious reduction in the rate of growth of earnings, so the higher 
order terms are not serving to catch the reduction in the rate of earnings growth with 
age which is common at higher adult ages. The squared terms are excluded in 
equation 2, in which all the variables are significant. The coefficients show that, 
between the ages of 7 and 14, the wage increases by 13 per cent for each extra year 
of age, by 5 per cent for each extra year of work experience, and by 11 per cent for 
the achievement of literacy. On the basis of this (admittedly small and fragile) data 
set we can say that, in terms of employment income, the achievement of literacy by 
children was worth about two years work experience. 
How much reliance can be placed on these results? We have not yet found other data 
sets from this early nineteenth century period which contain information on work 
experience or literacy, but some idea of the validity of the coefficient on AGE can be 
drawn from a comparison of equation 2 with an alternative earnings function estimated 
on the grouped data relating to child workers aged 7 to 14 recorded by Dr James 
Mitchell in his 1833 report to the Royal Commission on the Employment of Children 
in Factories .33 In this report Mitchell presents average weekly earnings for children 
of each age in 23 different locations and empIoyments in Britain . A simple earnings 
33 Mitchell ' s report is included in: Supplementary Report of the Royal Commission 
on the Employment of Children in Factories, Part I. PP 1834 XIX . 
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function based on age alone and estimated from this 1833 data is presented in equation 
3 of Table 1. The almost identical intercept term and coefficient on AGE found in 
this entirely separate data set is a strong indication that the coefficients in equation 2 
are plausible. 
TABLE 1 
OLS Earnings Functions 
Independent Variable = log of average weekly earnings in pence 
Equations 1 & 2: 
Equation 3: 
n 
AGE 
AGE2 
WORK 
WORJ(2 
LIT 
C 
1843 individual data 
1833 grouped data 
[1] [2] 
261 261 
.267 .127 
(1.61) (6 .79) 
-.006 
(-.86) 
.086 .049 
(1.78) (2.87) 
-.006 
(-.76) 
.116 .111 
(2.42) (2.32) 
1.24 2.04 
(1 .35) (11.9) 
[3] 
263 
.125 
(16 .7) 
2 .05 
(24.4) 
------- - ----------- -- - -- --------------- - -- -- -
R 2 
.35 .35 .52 
F 28 .9 47 .7 280 
(t-statistics in brackets) 
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The results in equation 2 are clear support for the assumption used by MFOS and 
others that education makes a positive contribution to economic performance, and they 
also allow us to begin to address the question of whether Britain was under or over-
investing in human capital creation through formal education in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. The Mitchell data shows that the average weekly wage for 7-14 
year old workers in 1833 was 33 pence per week. West has suggested that the 
average weekly cost of education to parents at this date in terms of expenditure on fees 
was 9 pence per week,34 so the total opportunity cost to parents of buying one week's 
education for a child was 42 pence per week, or, assuming a 45-week working year, 
£7 17s. 6d. per annum.35 According to equation 2, the achievement of literacy had 
about the same effect on age-standardised earnings as two years ' worth of work 
experience. If this reflects the real relative marginal productivity of literacy and 
experience, so that at the margin literacy would be traded for two years of child 
labour income, we can determine how many years of literacy-enhanced earnings were 
required to justify the costs of up to two years of foregone earnings together with the 
educational expenses of acquiring literacy; these costs together total around £15 15s. 
If we assume that educated children acquired their literacy by the age of lO and that 
the personal discount rate was 4.5 per cent per annum (the Consol rate plus a personal 
premium of 1.5 per cent), we can use the average age-specific income recorded by 
Mitchell in 1833 to calculate the number of years of literacy-enhanced earnings 
required to compensate parents for the cost of educating a child. As Figure I shows, 
over the age range 7 to 16 the average wages of boys and girls in 1833 were 
indistinguishable, but at 16 male earnings begin to accelerate so that by age 21 average 
male wages are double those of females . This means that any wage premium on 
34 West, 'Resource allocation', p. 85 . 
35 As mentioned above, the recent comparison made by Boot of the cost of formal 
education and on-the job training is flawed , because the opportunity cost of foregone 
earnings is omitted from the estimation of the overall cost of formal education. See 
Boot, 'How skilled' , pp. 12-13. 
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literacy that extends into adult ages will differentially affect the returns to education 
for males and females , making education less attractive for females . On the other 
hand, a literacy premium paid to an adult worker is much less likely to be captured 
by parents than is a similar premium paid to a child worker, and parents are unlikely 
to obtain any return after the marriage of a child (mean ages of marriage were 26.9 
years and 25.7 years respectively for males and females in 1851 , slightly lower in the 
1830s).36 This would diminish the impact of adult male/female wage differentials 
on earlier education decisions . Using the Mitchell wage data, a constant 11 per cent 
wage premium for literacy, and again assuming a 45 week working year to make some 
allowance for short-time and stoppages, we find that at age 10 males require 12 years 
and females 14 years of literacy enhanced wages for the discounted present value of 
the literacy wage premium to match the cost of two years of education and foregone 
earnings . 
The Registrar-General ' s estimates of literacy derived from the 1841 census were 67 .3 
per cent for males and 51.1 per cent for females37 , a difference which may be 
explained by the relative returns that parents could expect to capture from the literacy 
of their male and female children up to age 22. If literacy rates were a direct function 
of literacy-enhanced wage premia secured by parents up to the 22nd birthday of their 
children, with male literacy rates of 67 .3 per cent, the economic returns to education 
would justify female literacy rates of 55 .2 per cent. These are illustrative estimates, 
and they depend crucially on assumptions about the amount and cost of schooling 
required to achieve literacy, and on the appropriate discount rate . Nevertheless they 
indicate that an economic explanation may account for the differential literacy rates 
of males and females in the 184Os. 
36 Wrigley and Schofield, Population history, p. 437 . 
37 Sanderson, Education, p 17 . 
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Whether this economic explanation is also a human capital explanation must remain, 
for the present, an open question . The age-wage profiles plotted in Figure I would 
seem to support a human capital explanation of earnings up to age 16, but it is not 
clear that rapidly growing male/female earnings differentials from age 16 can be 
accounted for in human capital terms. The existence of a 'female wage' in the 
nineteenth century has most frequently been explained in cultural terms,38 and we 
intend to undertake a quantitative evaluation of alternative explanations in a subsequent 
paper. For the moment we can note that Mitchell's 1833 wage data may be consistent 
with human capital explanations of remuneration for children and adolescents, and 
with dual labour market/discrimination explanations for adults. 
ii) Internal labour markets 
In order to assess whether or not spot wage were prevalent, or whether internal labour 
markets operated, we need to analyze individual wage profiles of groups of workers 
in particular firms . One rich , and surprisingly neglected, source of individual wage 
histories is provided by railway company staff records. The importance of the railway 
companies in terms of the national labour market was obvious: in 1873 their 
workforce of 275,000 accounted for approximately 3 per cent of the occupied male 
labour force and by 1913 these figures had increased to 643 ,000 and 4.5 per cent.39 
Further, the railway companies of the late nineteenth century were perceived to be 
good employers who offered 'secure jobs for life' and thus potentially operated an 
internal labour market. Indeed, the business history literature on railway companies 
liberally uses the term ' internal labour market' . What this actually means, however, 
is either left vague or is used from the perspective of industrial relations (in that it 
38 Baines, 'Labour supply', pp. 164-6; Hunt, British labour history, pp. 23-5 . For 
a discussion of the origins of the exclusion of women from certain occupations, the 
development of patriarchy and the idea of the 'family wage' in Europe, see Honeyman 
and Goodman, 'Women's work', pp. 611, 622-3 . For a review of sex discrimination 
in the British textile industry see Freifeld, 'Technological change' . 
39 Gourvish , Railways, pp. 9-10. 
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captures the idea that railway companies offered industrial welfare, in one form or 
another, to their workers) and not in an economic sense. 4O What follows reports some 
preliminary results based on a sample of the weekly paid traffic staff records of the 
Great Eastern Railway Company (henceforth GER) .41 
The sample was based on the life histories of all those traffic staff who entered 
employment with the GER before 1880.42 To avoid problems associated with World 
War One and the wages explosion in its aftermath it was decided to only record the 
life histories up until 1913 . Further, individuals were excluded if: their records were 
incomplete or showed signs of erratic changes that were not explained; if they 
transferred from another part of the GER, such as the "Goods· division, (on the 
grounds that in such cases we lacked their previous company history); and if the 
records revealed that they rented property from the company (since it would be 
difficult to compute the true imputed value of their rent) . The GER traffic wages staff 
records are collected in 20 volumes and contain records on over 10,000 individuals: 
our sample reduced this to an initial pool of 851 individuals. In most of the results 
reported below wages were actually converted into real wages using the Feinstein 
consumer goods and service price index and since this series begins in 1870 this 
40 Drummond, 'Specifically designed?'; Turner, 'Man and Braverman'; Melling, 
'Employers'; Fitzgerald, British labour mana&ement. 
41 Public Records Office, Kew (hereafter PRO)/RAIL 227/459 - 479 (GER. Wages 
Staff Histories Registers. Traffic Staff). It is unclear exactly when or why the records 
were created but it appears that were compiled into the ledgers now held in the PRO 
in the early 1920s (probably in 1923, at the time of the amalgamation) from other 
records that no longer exist. It would also appear that the records recount the life 
histories of the existing workforce at the time they were compiled and they therefore 
give a curious picture of a very stable workforce that experiences no voluntary exits; 
the only exits recorded are for those workers who retired , died or were dismissed 
(although unless we believe the GER was a very benevolent employer the latter 
category is almost certainly far from complete) . 
42 Although the company was founded in 1862 some of the individuals in our 
sample have life histories which start before that date, the earliest being 1853 . 
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Figure 2. Entry wage by age of GER traffic staff entrants, 1858- 79 
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eliminated workers who entered before that date and effectively reduced the pool to 
757.43 
Figures two and three use the nominal entry wages of 851 workers to assess if older 
workers were judged to be more productive than younger workers - did they receive 
higher wages? Figure two is a simple scatter diagram plotting the age of each entrant 
at point of entry against their initial nominal wage. It shows a clear break in the 
minimum entry wage received after the age of 20: between the ages of 13 and 17 the 
minimum entry wage received was 5 shillings; this then jumped to 7 shillings at age 
18 and increased by a further 70 per cent to 12 shillings by age 20.44 By age 23 the 
minimum entry wage settled down to a fairly standard figure of 15 shillings. In real 
terms the minimum entry wage received by each age group increased progressively 
with the largest jumps occurring before the age of twenty: between the ages of 15 and 
19 the increase in the minimum age received by each successive age group ranged 
from 16 per cent (at age 19) to 35 per cent (at age 17) whereas after the age of20 the 
maximum increase was only 6 per cent. 45 
Figure three attempts to add some more flesh to the scatter diagram by showing the 
average entry wage for each age. It suggests that GER operated two different age-
related payments systems: one for workers under the age of 20 and a different one for 
workers over the age of 20. The average entry wage profile in figure three is steepest 
during the early years , when it might be expected that young recruits needed some on 
the job training which should have yielded rapid gains in productivity, but thereafter 
progresses at a much slower pace (possibly reflecting the fact that most traffic workers 
43 Feinstein, National income, table 61 , Tl32. 
44 The minimum entry wage for the 19 year old group is shown as 5 shillings in 
figure one but this was received by only one individual and is therefore misleading. 
45 The sample for the real wage calculation excludes those who entered the 
company before 1870. 
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were engaged in tasks , such as portering and ticket collecting, where the scope for 
increased productivity was limited). However, one of the most striking features of this 
sample is the very low variation in entry wages relative to the mean entry wage of 
each age group for those workers aged above 19: the coefficient of variation on entry 
wages by age fluctuates between 0.01 and 0.03 between the ages of 19 and 29 (with 
the exception of the 26 year old age group who register a figure of 0.10) . This 
suggests that young workers were paid a spot wage but that for workers over the age 
of 19 no human capital explanation is appropriate (unless their productivity did 
stagnate) since it appears they were paid a relatively fixed standard wage of between 
15 and 17 shillings .40 
Before drawing firm conclusions from these results, however, we need to consider the 
data more closely: the term ' traffic staff actually encompasses many different types 
of jobs (from the expected porters, signalmen and guards to stablemen, tram 
conductors, seamen, toilet attendants, and an Assistant Searcher and Footwarmer) and 
even entrants with similar entry point job descriptions may , at point of entry, be set 
on quite different career paths or their bland job description may hide subtleties in 
grade. In order to be more confident about what the data is telling us we therefore 
need to make sure, as far as possible, that we are indeed comparing like with like . 
The obvious way forward is to look at entrants who have the same job description. 
The initial pool of 851 entrants actually encompasses no less than 71 different job 
descriptions. Of these , 16 job descriptions (covering 532 entrants , or 63 % of the total) 
include the word 'porter' in their title (ranging from Gateman Porter to Lad Porter 
Number Taker to Probationary Porter Signalman) . A brief survey of these 'porters' 
revealed, however, that they appeared to be doing quite different jobs - 'porter' would 
40 If the nominal figures are replaced by real wages the average entry wage profile 
follows a similar pattern to that shown in figure three but is much smoother. Further, 
the very low variation in entry wages compared to the mean is even more pronounced 
and starts a year earlier: for those age groups 18 to 29 the coefficient of variation for 
entry real wages only twice exceeds 0.01 , and in the case of both exceptions (age 
groups 23 and 26) it only reaches 0.02. 
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Figure 4. Entry real wage by age of GER porters, 1870-79 
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appear to have been used in job descriptions as a bit of a catch-all phrase, if the job 
entailed any portering duties then the word 'porter' appeared in its description which 
makes it very difficult, with the information available to us, to divine if a Porter 
Shuntsman was a porter who occasionally did some shunting or vice versa or whether 
the job entailed a large component of both jobs. The solution to this problem was to 
simply consider those entrants described as either 'Porter' or 'Lad Porter' .47 
Excluding workers who entered before 1870 so that real wages could be calculated 
yielded a pool of porters numbering 395 entrants (representing 52.2 % of all entrants 
between 1870 and 1879).48 
Figure four is a scatter diagram of the entry real wages of porters. Like figure two it 
shows a sharp break in the pattern of minimum entry wages at age 20: between the 
ages of 16 and 20 there is a rapid increase in the minimum entry wage but thereafter 
it remains relatively stable.49 Figure five considers the average entry real wage 
profile of the porters . It again shows the rapid increases in entry real wages up to the 
age of 20 (in fact the average entry real wage doubled between the ages of 15 and 20) 
being followed by a basically stable average entry real wage (which fluctuated between 
15.6 shillings and 16.7 shillings) . However, one important difference between the 'all 
47 The term 'Lad Porter' does not appear to have any important significance other 
than up to the age of 16 a porter entrant had a three in four chance of being 
designated a lad porter rather than a porter. Of our sample of porters (that is porters 
plus lad porters) 20 % were lad porters and although most were aged 18 or under, with 
only 6 of the 87 lad porters being over that age, the oldest lad porter was 22 years 
old. There is no obvious difference in the wage paid to a porter or a lad porter who 
were of the same age at point of entry. 
48 The date of entry profile of porters is very similar to the date of entry of all 
entrants and thus does not appear to introduce any bias in that direction . 
49 Between the ages of 16 and 17 the minimum entry real wage increased from 5.1 
shillings to 7.0 shillings (or 37 per cent), at age 18 it had increased to 9.6 shillings 
(another 37 per cent) and by age 20 it had leapt to 13.5 shillings (an increase of 41 
per cent compared to age 18) . The wage in shillings is given as a decimal figure : thus, 
5.1 shillings is not 5 shillings and one pence but 5 shillings and 1.2 pence. 
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entrants' sample and the porters relates to the coefficient of variation for the 20+ age 
groups: for 'all entrants' we found virtually no variation relative to the mean wage 
(especially in real terms) but for the porters the coefficient of variation is, with two 
exceptions, either 0.06 or 0.07 (for age groups 25 and 28 it is 0.04) . This evidence 
suggests a more subtle picture of the payments system than that suggested by the 'all 
entrants' data (which almost certainly introduces aggregation bias into its results): that 
is, spot wages were paid up to the age of 20 but thereafter a standardised payments 
system was operated which had built into it an element of flexibility which rewarded 
(or punished) workers according to their marginal productivity (or perceived marginal 
productivity) .50 
If an internal labour market was in operation then the entry wages of workers alone 
do not give us enough information to investigate the human capital implications, 
indeed by the very nature of entry wages in such a market they would offer a biased 
picture. Thus, we need to look at the lifetime earnings profile of a sample of workers . 
In order to try and compare like with like it was decided to select a sample of workers 
who followed similar career paths. This was much more problematic than it first 
appeared since the 851 individuals in our sample followed more than 650 different 
career paths!SI The most popular career path was that which involved a simple two 
step process from porter to signalman: 37 individuals who joined the Company 
50 In order to check that porters were representative, and that therefore the results 
based on the all entrants sample were guilty of aggregation bias, two other popular job 
categories were tested: greasers (of whom there were 43 in the 1870-79 sample) and 
signalmen (of whom there were 33) . The average wage by entrant age profiles for 
both were similar to that of the porters: there was an increase in average wage for 
younger entrants but thereafter the profile became much shallower (although the 
Signalman profile did experience an unexplained but noticeable dip at age 23). 
SI The actual number of career paths is much lower than this since each job 
description was treated a separate step whereas, in fact , one job may have been 
covered by several job descriptions (as we have seen, for example, at point of entry 
there would appear to have been no substantial difference between the job description 
lad porter and porter) . 
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Figure 6. Average real wage by age, 1870-1913 
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between 1870 and 1879 followed this path . The evidence from these workers implies 
that GER did operate an implicit contract system. 
Figure six shows the average real wage by age of the porter-signalman group: the 
relatively low wages at the early ages increased rapidly (suggesting either that on the 
job training increased productivity rapidly at such young ages and/or that the young 
workers were deliberately paid below their marginal productivity in order to bear the 
cost of their training and in return for above marginal productivity wages later) and 
were then followed by a clear and steady upward rise before tailing off at the very old 
ages (a classic seniority wage profile) .s2 As mentioned above, the seniority wage 
payments system is usually based on length of service, not age, and figure seven 
therefore produces an average real wage by length of service profile. This shows that 
workers gained rapidly in their initial years with the company (in the first seven years 
the average real wage increased by 30 per cent) but then experienced a relatively 
stable wage (of 20-21 shillings) for the next 16 years of service after which there was 
gradual rise in the average real wage (it reached 25 shillings after 30 years of service 
and 29 shillings after forty years of service). This reinforces the idea that GER 
operated some form of implicit contract system. 
Conclusion 
None of the above evidence supports the view of a spot wage payments system, a view 
that is implicit in MFOS . It would appear that GER did operate an internal labour 
market in which the implicit contract was based on some form of seniority wages; the 
only exception to this was possibly younger workers whose wage profile is indicative 
of, though not definite proof of, a spot wage system - something which also appears 
to be the case with textile workers in the 18305. GER is , of course, only one firm out 
of many thousands operating in the British economy in this period and the results from 
S2 The fluctuations shown at older ages in figure six are a reflection of the fact that 
only a small number of individuals in our sample reached those ages. 
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this preliminary study cannot be simply expanded to the whole economy. However, 
the only other comparable work on the British economy in the nineteenth century, that 
by Boot, also suggests that the Bank of Scotland operated a seniority wage payments 
system.53 
It would be unwise to try and draw any definite conclusions from this preliminary 
study of textile and railway workers: the aim was to try and show that our 
understanding of the human capital issues involved and their implications for economic 
growth in more general terms is still poor but that human capital theory offers 
economic historians a powerful tool to investigate these issues and should, eventually, 
allow us to reduce the error of plus or minus 50 per cent that underlies our best 
existing guesstimates of the impact of changes in labour quality on British economic 
growth . 
53 Boot, 'Salaries' . 
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